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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
\YILFRIED ROSSBERG and 
IYY ROSSBERG, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants: 
vs. 
LEOXARDA. HOLESAPPLE 
and IR:JIA HOLESAPPLE, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
CASE No. 7802 
BRIEF OF DEFE~DAXTS AXD APPELLEES 
STATE~fENT OF FACTS 
\\'"hile we substantially agree with the appellants' 
statement of the evidence, we feel it would be proper 
to state some additional facts which will present a 
more complete picture to the court of this matter. 
In referring to the record, we will cite the page 
numbers in the lower center of the page. 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
··.An of the allegations in appellants' complaint were 
admitted by the Holesapples in their answe::.·, with the 
exception that liability upon the $1600 note \'.-as denied. 
under our usury statute (R. 1-5). At the commencement 
of the trial it was stipulated between counsel that the 
note which was executed and delivered by the Hole-, 
sapples to appellants was for the face amount of $1600 
at 6% interest per annum, whereas the I-Iolesapples 
received only $1500 from appellants (R. 7-9). The $100 
differe:nce on this ninety-day note vvas held to be usurious 
in the court below. 
On April11, 1951 the Holesapples paid $500 earnest 
money to the appellant real estate salesman. The pre-
liminary agreement required the IIolesapples to pay 
an additional $2000 nine days later on April 20th towards 
the purchase of certain residential property in Salt Lake 
City (Exhibit A). The real estate salesman (herein-
a:fter .caHed ap.pellant) knew that Mr. and :Mrs. Hole-
sapple intended to sell the equity in their present home 
to pay tb.is $2000 on the April 20th closing date becam;e 
the earnest money agreement provided the following: 
· "Buyer hereby agrees to apply 'any additional 
am9unt above $2500 received on the sale of (their) 
pr·operty at 355 :Marietta Ave. on principal bal-
ance of above, up to the amount of an additional 
$500. '' (Exhibit A, lines 15-16). 
Nine da.ys (April 11th to 20th) did not prove long 
enough for the Holesapples to complete the sale of the1r 
home. On the tenth day, a Saturday, appellant and 
1L H. Christensen, owner of Christensen Realty Co., 
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callell to see ~[r. and ~Irs. IIolesapple (R. 13). Appel-
lant'~ description of this vi~it reads as follo·ws: 
"Q. "\Y as there 'any discussion as to what the 
defendants (Holesapples) might do so as not to 
forfeit any money under this (earnest money) 
agreement? 
A. Yes. They understood that they would 
probably have to go through with the transaction 
* * *. Now the closing date (April 20th) went 
by, and they were still desirous of having the 
property. I suggested that I might be able·· to 
negotiate a loan for them until the property was 
sold" (R. 13). 
Appellant also testified that the Holesapples stated 
to him that their troubles would be over if the house 
were sold (R. 13), and that appellant did mention to 
them the fact that he thought he might be able to get 
some money (R. 14). 
Appellant called in person on the Holesapples the 
next morning (Sunday) at 10:30 A.M. and talked first 
to ~Ir. Holesapple on the front lawn (R. 57), and then 
went in the house and talked to ~Irs. Holesapple (R. 58). 
On direct examination appellant stated the following: 
''A. * * * Sunday morning somewheres near 
10:30 A.M. I did contact the defendant (Hole-
sapple) and told them I felt that I could get the 
money or at least I would be willing to try to 
get the money for them; that, however, in obtain-
ing the money that they would have to agree to 
$1600 for the fifteen hundred (dollars) which I 
would put up; and at th~at time they told me to 
go ahead and see what I could do for them on it. 
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"r,'.;'.;~e·- Q. Was there any particular discussion as 
to why they were to pay $1600 ~ 
A. Not particularly except for the fact that 
I told them I felt that that is the amount it would 
take to be able to secure the money" (R. 14) . 
.Jf r. 11 ole~ a pplc> 's testimony at the trial differed 
son1ewhat from the foregoing .. He declared that he did 
not agree to pay $1600 for the $1500 loan until several 
days later after appellant indicated he had the money, 
and at the very mon1ent he signed the note. (R. 62-63). 
The Sunday morning convei·sation, according to Mr. 
Holesapple, was as follows: 
~ f7 . 
"A. !dr. Rossberg (appellant) said that he 
was going to Logan and possibly could obtain the 
money, but there would be a $100 fee, use fee 
on $1500. I told him we couldn't pay $1500 and 
. $100, as we did not have the hundred dollars to 
pay out; and he made the statement that he had 
discussed this with 1\Ir. Christensen and that 
they had agreed that due to the fact that they 
were getting a good commission on the sale that 
they would absorb the hundred dollars, which 
was later denied by l\1:r. Christensen" (R. 57-58). 
Appellant told the Holesapples that the party in 
Logan required that $1600 be paid for the $1500 loan 
for the use of a "quick loan" (R. 58). Appellant spe-
cifically admitted that the $100 "fee" was not not to 
cover any of the expenses of the trip to Logan where 
he said he obtained the money (R. 26, 27, -59). 
The ·record is devoid of any evidence ·whether or 
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not appellant telephoned to Logan prior to his Sunday 
afternoon trip to detern1ine whether $1500 nwaitt>d hin1 
there, but there is no dispute that he and his wife saw 
his father-in-law while there (R. 15 ), and that the next 
morning he offered the Holesapples the loan of $1500 
if they would agree to pay hi1n back $1600 (R. 17). 
Appellant admitted he would receive a commission of 
$306 if the sale to Holesapples \Yent through, and indi-
cated he was desirous, "as any salesman would· be,", of 
the sale going through at the time he scheduled his trip 
to Logan (R. 33). :JI. H. Christensen indicated that the 
Holesapples told him they would prefer to get the loan 
from a source other than appellant (R. 50), but Mr. 
Holesapple said that he couldn't do anything else, 
because they had five hundred dollars· of his money 
(R. 59). 
There was some testimony by appellant of another 
transaction (R. 30-37) he handled for Christensen Realty 
Co. where a person named Miller was asked to sign a 
note by appellant in a real estate transaction (R. 30). 
In that m.1tter appellant knew that a third party had 
some property for sale for $4900 (R. 31). App~llant 
learned that ~\Iiller was anxious to buy said property, 
but appellant could not remember whether or not he 
advised the seller that :Miller was anxious to purchase 
the property although he had no down payment (R. 33). 
The property in question was thereupon purchased by 
appellant (R. 31) and sold to Miller for $5500 (R. 32). 
In addition, appellant received a commission on selling 
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to himself. Appellant and Mr. Christensen split the 
real estate commissions on the sale from the third 
party to appellant (R. 32, 37). 
On Tuesday, April 24, 1951, after Holesapples had 
not acted on appellant's offer to loan them $1500 for 
$1600, M. H. Christensen telephoned Mr. and ~Irs. 
Rohlfing, the sellers on the earnest money agreement 
with the Holesapples (Exhibit A), and had them come 
in to sign two sets of uniforn1 real estate contracts 
( R. 20-21, 38, 44-45, 46). Both sets were said to be 
identical except that on one the appellants '\Vere shown 
as purchasers and on the other the Holcsapples were 
the purchasers (R. 38), although the contract with appel-
lants'-names a.s purchasers was destroyed (R. 48). M. H. 
Christensen apparently was to have a one-half interest 
in the contract of appellants (R. 47), although his name 
did not appear thereon. The testimony of Mr. Rohlfing, 
when asked what his purpose was in signing two sets 
of contracts, was as follows: 
"Well, that's a good question. My idea was 
to get it closed, and it had gone along and was 
three or four days overdue, and my wife and I 
felt that we wanted to get it cut and dried once 
and for all, so the morning '"~e went to the real 
estate office there was these two sets of contracts. 
Mr. Christensen explained it to us, and we both 
agreed on it, and we signed both copies" (R. 39). 
The concluding testimony of Mr. Holesapple is set 
forth below: 
"Q. Did you at any time on the occasion of 
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this conYPrsation in Your home on this Sunday 
prior to the closing ~f this dt>al or at nny other 
time request :Jlr. Rossberg to go to Logan· or 
elsewhere to negotiate a loan for you 1 
A. I did not. 
Q. Did you at any time agree to pay hiln a 
hundred dollars for so doing 1 
A. X ot until I signed the note. It was on 
the note. 
Q. Prior to the execution of the note, did 
you ever at any time agree to pay him a hundred 
dollars for negotiating this loan or any .loan for 
you? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. And when you signed the note, of course, 
you agreed to pay the sixteen hundred dollars. 
That's in the note itself¥ 
A. Yes, that's in the note" (R. 62-63). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. 
Intent is not an element to be proved where, as here, 
usury is apparent, either on the face of the instrument, 
rr can be clearly inferred from existing facts. 
II. 
This transaction involved neither a sale of credit 
nor a sale of services with incidental expenses, because 
it was simply a loan of money which demanded a usuri-
our amount for the use of the money loaned. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
INTENT IS NOT AN ELEMENT TO BE PROVED 
WHERE, AS HERE, USURY IS APPARENT, EITHER ON 
THE FACE OF THE INSTRUMENT, OR CAN BE CLEARLY 
INFERRED FROM EXISTING FACTS. 
The major contention set forth by appellants is 
that the decree of the court below, which declared the 
note for $1600 usurious and void, should be reversed 
because of failure to prove the existence of a "corrupt 
intent'' to violate the usury statute. Prime reliance in 
support of this position is placed upon the 1915 case of 
Cobb 'L". Hartenstein, 47 Utah 174, 152 Pac. 424. 
The foregoing case clearly is not applicable to sup-
port the contention of appellants. It involved a trancl-
action between two stockbrokers. who were both mem-
bers of the Salt Lake Stock and Mining Exchange. The 
disputed transaction involved two printed contracts 
with blanks for only the nan1es of the seller and buyer, 
the number of shares and the kind of stock and the 
amounts of money involved. The sole question in the 
case was whether these contracts, which were in daily 
use on the Salt Lake City stock exchange, were to 
cover a sale as they appe-ared to be, or if they \rere 
actually a device to cover a pretended s.ale which ·was 
in reality a loan of money at a usurious rate. The court 
held that under the facts of the case, the contracts were 
not usurious, and ruled that the transactions were not 
usurious because there was no corrupt intent. The 
10 
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analysis of the court at page 430 is worthy of consid-
eration: 
"'Yhere the contract on its face is usurious, 
the intention may be inferred, and the inference 
may be so strong that no express denial can avoid 
the same. 'Yhere, however, as here, the contract 
is a legitimate one, and is one that is frequently 
used by stockbrokers, but it is nevertheless con-
tended that it is ~a. mere shift, cloak, or cover for 
usury, then it requires- substantial evidence of 
a corrupt intent, or some fact or facts from which 
such an intention may be clearly inferred. (Em .. -
phasis supplied) 
When appellant stipulated that he required the Hole-
sapples to sign a note for $1600 when he gave them 
only $1500 to apply on their real estate contract (R._7-8), 
that fact alone would either make the note usurious 
(in effect) on the face of the matter, or is at -least a 
fact from which a usurious intent could be. clea:rly 
inferred. The statement of facts, supra, clearly s_ets' 
forth additional facts from which the court could prop-
erly infer such an intention. 
There are many cases which have held that a note 
or other obligation which. is for an amount in excess of 
the amount actually loaned, is usurious and void. In 
Bochicchio v. Petrocelli, 126 Conn. 336, 11 A. 2d 356 
( 1940), the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors was 
called upon to determine vvhether a note for $1650, with 
interest at 6o/o per annu1n, which was given for a loan 
of $1500, \Va.s usurious. The court, in the following, Ian"' 
gunge, held that it was: 
11 
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"The original note in this case having been 
payable on demand and lra.ving been made for a 
sum in excess of the amount actually loaned, it 
was within the power of the payee to exact a 
return greater than at the rate of 12 per cent 
per annum upon the money 'actually loaned, and 
the note on the face of it was usurious." 
See also the following cases, all of which involved 
notes or other obligations for an amount in excess of 
the amount actually loaned, all of which were declared to 
be usurious and void: Le1:enson v. Cohen, 250 :Mich. 3l, 
229 N. W. 433 (1930), which involved a $10,000 con-
tract for a loan of $8,200; 'TVolfe v. Stevenson, 129 Okla. 
148, 264 P. 182 (1928), concerning a note for $200 with 
interest at 10o/o when only $175 was actually loaned; 
Ternple Tntst Co. v. llfoore, 133 Tex. 429, 126 S.\Y. 2d 
949 (1939), a note for $2800 providing for 7j~ interest 
which was given for a loan of $2230; Temple Tr·ust Co. 
v. Haney, 133 Tex. 414, 126 S.,V. 2d 950 (1939), which 
involved one note for $2500 given for $2230, and another 
note for $2240 for a loan of $2000; Glenn v. Ingram, 133 
Tex. 431, 126 S.vV. 2d 951 (1939), concerning a note for 
$3200 face amount, with interest at 77c, given for a loan 
of $2800; and Van Doren v. Pelt, 184 S.\V. 2d 744 (1945, 
:Missouri Appellate Court), where the note was made 
out for $150 and the loan was $135. 
In Independent Foods, Inc. v. Lucas Co. Sa1:iugs 
Ba-nk, ______ Ohio App. ------, 70 N.E. 2d 139 (1946), the 
court in holding the transaction before it to be usurious, 
stated the following: 
12 
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"There is a seeming confusion in some of the 
cases as to the place and in1portance of intent in 
determining whether charges by a lender are to 
be considered usurious. However, the cases uni-
fonnly hold that where the transaction is in the 
form of a lO'an and the charges exceed the inter-
est permitted by law, the loan is held to be usuri-
ous without any proof of an intent by the parties 
to make a usurious loan.'' 
In the course of the opinion, the court cites several texts 
on this general subject, some of ·which are as follmvs :_ 
Williston on Con tracts, Vol. 6, page 4807 : 
''Ignorance of the law is generally no excuse and 
where a trans~action, unmistakably a loan, is 
made for a rate of interest exceeding that per-
mitted by la-w, the transaction would appear nec-
essarily usurious.'' 
Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Vol. 2, 
Note to Sec. 526, page 1022 : ''The extent to which 
intent is important, in determining whether a 
transaction is usurious, both in criminal _and in 
civil cases, has caused great differences of statu-
tory interpretation and judicial decisions. Thus, 
there are many decisions that a wrongful intent 
is one of the necessary ele1nents of usury; yet, 
at least in civil cases, it may be doubted whether 
intent is of any importance, if the facts clearly 
establish usury and the parties were acting under 
no mistake.'' 
'11he Ohio court indicates that the following are 
cited to indicate cases where the intent may be of 
it:~portance in determining whether the transaction was 
usurious: 
Will is ton on Con tracts, Vol. 6, page 4809 : 
13 
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"Intent is chiefly important as characterizing 
transactions not in the form of loans. The law 
does not permit parties to evade usury statutes 
by giving the form of a sale or exchange, bail-
ment or lease to what is really intended as a 
loan of money, and the validity of such trans-
actions depends on whether the parties ·\\'ere 
using an apparently legal form as a mere device 
or in good faith intended to unke such a bargain 
in reality as they did in appearance." 
Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Vol. 2, 
page 1022: "Where, however, the transaction is 
not in the form of a loan, a wrongful intent, at 
least of the lender, to use the device of a sale 
or lease as a means of making what amounts in 
effect to a loan, is universally held essential in 
order to make the transaction usurious.'' 
II. 
THIS TRANSACTION INVOLVED NEITHER A SALE 
OF CREDIT NOR A SALE OF SERVICES WITH INCI-
DENTAL EXPENSES, BECAUSE IT WAS SIMPLY A LOAN 
O,F MONEY WHICH DEMANDED A USURIOUS AMOUNT 
FOR THE USE OF THE MONEY LOANED. 
It is a well settled principle not requiring cita-
tion that, whm.·e a contract for a loan provides for the 
rendition of services or incurring of reasonable and 
proper expenses incidental thereto by the lender, a fajr 
charge, in addition to the legal rate of interest on the 
money loaned, does not render the contract usurious. 
Fisher v. Adamson, 47 Utah 3, 151 Pac. 351 (1915), is 
such a case; see also 27 Ruling Case Law 231. It i::; 
also fundamental that the usury laws apply only to the 
14 
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reserYing, taking or securing of a sum greater than the 
pre~cribed limit for a '"loan or forbearance of any 
money, goods or things in action" (U.C.A., 1943, 44-0-6). 
In other words, usury la"·s have not applied to sales, 
and appellant contends that this transaction was not a 
loan but was, in reality, a sal~ of appellant's credit .. 
Of course the testimony of appellant himself was that he 
might be able to negotiate a loan for the Holesapples 
until their property could be sold (R. 13), and the only 
evidence in the record upon which appellants now seek 
to rely is that :Mr. Holesapple stated on cross-examina-
tion that he understood appellant would. use his credit 
to obtain the ·$1500 when the Holesapples had difficulty 
in completing the sale of their house. 
The cases involving an exception for the sale of 
credit have not been recognized by our courts. These 
cases apparently are limited to situations involving com-
mission merchants, produce dealers seeking to finance 
their business, warehousemen, etc., and transactions 
which involve the exchange of commercial paper in 
the regular, ordinary course of business. Such cases 
seem clearly to have no application to the present case. 
The two cases cited on page 18 of appellants' brief 
actually hold the transactions contained therein are not 
sales of credit, as contended, but were usurious loans 
of money. TVhite v. Anderson, 164 Mo. App. 132, 147 
S.\V. 1122; Palmer v. Jones, 23 N.Y.S. 584. 
The general question concerning expenses incident 
to a loan are discussed in 21 A.L.R. 797 ; 53 A.L.R. 7 43 ; 
15 
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63 A.L.R. 823 ; and 105 A.L.R. 795; and need no dis-
cussion under the facts of this case because there was 
clearly no agreement to pay any expenses as is required 
under the cases discussed in the foregoing annotations. 
CONCLUSION 
It is appellees' position that the transaction now 
before the Court was a loan of money and not a sale, 
and that the loan was usurious under the facts and the 
law. Wherefore, it is respectfully urged that the judg-
ment of the trial court be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WOODROW D. WHITE, 
Attorney for Defendants 
and Respondents 
16 
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